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JUDGE HAND'S HISTORY: AN ANALYSIS OF HISTORY
AND METHOD IN JAFFREE V. BOARD OF SCHOOL
COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS*
In Jaffree v. Board of School Commissioners,1 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama upheld, against a constitutional
challenge, teacher led school prayers. In the companion case of Jaffree v.
James,2 the court upheld the Alabama Prayer Law which permitted state
sanctioned prayers in public schools. The religious exercises and the Prayer
Law were, of course, unconstitutional when viewed in light of decisions of the
United States Supreme Court holding that the first amendment erected a
wall of separation between church and state.3 When faced with direct and set-
tled precedent, the lower federal courts generally follow the decisions of the
Supreme Court.
The district court, however, was listening to a different drummer. It an-
nounced that it should:
attempt to ascertain the intent of the adoptors, and after ascertaining that at-
tempt to apply the Constitution as its adoptors intended it to be applied....
Amendment through judicial fiat is both unconstitutional and illegal. Amend-
ment through judicial fiat breeds disrespect for the law and it undermines the
very basic notion that this country is governed by laws and not by men.'
So the district court set aside decisions of the Supreme Court and looked
instead to history. First, the district court concluded that the first amend-
ment, as originally passed, guaranteed to each individual that Congress
would not impose a national religion. Since the establishment clause applied
only to the federal government the states were free to allow or prohibit
religious establishment under their own constitutions and laws. Second, the
court concluded that the "historical record" established that "when the four-
teenth amendment was ratified in 1868 ... its ratification did not incorporate
the first amendment against the states."5 Indeed, the court concluded that
none of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights limit the states.
As a statement of law, the district court's opinion in Jaffree is of little
* A.B. 1964, University of the South; J.D. 1969, University of North Carolina, Member of the
North Carolina Bar; partner in the firm Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy,
Greensboro, North Carolina. Copyright 1983 by Michael Kent Curtis. I am indebted to my law
partner, Charles A. Lloyd for directing my attention to Blackstone's use of the words "privileges
and immunities."
554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
554 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
Compare Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1131 (S.D. Ala. 1983), with Engle v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) and Abbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1126.
Id. at 1119.
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significance. The decision was promptly reversed.' However, the opinion is
significant because it exemplifies the recent assault on the legitimacy of
federal protection of civil liberties. The opinion is part of a growing body of
political opinion which asserts that the federal courts should not be em-
powered to enforce the limitations of the Bill of Rights on the states. For ex-
ample, George F. Will, a widely published columnist, has announced that the
Supreme Court took "a radically wrong turn when it 'incorporated the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth' ....,,7 Senator East of North Carolina has
proposed a bill which would overturn court rulings holding that the federal
courts may protect Bill of Rights liberties against the states.'
Those who seek to free the states from the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights point to history as their justification and claim that they are dispas-
sionately and scientifically following the evidence where it leads.' The pur-
pose of this article is to analyze the Jaffree decision on its own terms-to ex-
amine the court's claim that it was merely performing a neutral and dispas-
sionate inquiry into the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment.
I. THE AUTHORITIES
In support of its historical analysis, the district court relied almost ex-
clusively on an article written by Charles Fairman0 as construed in Govern-
ment by Judiciary by Raoul Berger. Although the court concluded that the
majority of disinterested observers approved Fairman's analysis rejecting
total incorporation of the Bill of Rights," the court overlooked a number of
scholars who have concluded that the fourteenth amendment was designed to
incorporate all rights in the Bill of Rights as limits on the states." Even more
6 Justice Powell, in his capacity as Eleventh Circuit Justice, granted a stay of the district
court's decision on February 11, 1983. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 103 S. Ct. 842 (1983).
Three months later, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
holding in Jaffree relating to the first and fourteenth amendment issues. Only the district court's
ruling not to grant class certification was affirmed by the court of appeals. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705
F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
G. Will, A Labored Ruling on Pornography, Greensboro Record, July 21, 1982, at A-12, col.
3-6.
, S. 3018, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
9 E.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY]. This article deals only with
the Jaffree court's conclusion about the fourteenth amendment. As to its history of the first
amendment, see L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS 169-233 (1972). For an interesting analysis of the legitimacy
question see L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT (1975).
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Fairman].
" Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1121 n.28.
"E.g., H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 40 (1982); I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 302-59
(1967); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Consitutional Limitations on
State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of
[Vol. 86
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significant, the Jaffree court failed to see that Professor Fairman reached a
conclusion different from its own. After "brooding" over the fourteenth
amendment debates for some time, Professor Fairman "slowly" concluded
that the amendment was designed to protect against state action those rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."3 Since Professor Fairman himself
believed that the fourteenth amendment justified selective incorporation of
rights in the Bill of Rights, the district court's reliance on him to disprove
any incorporation was grossly misplaced. Another scholar relied on by the
court concluded that the fourteenth amendment was designed to make the
establishment clause binding on the states. 4
The Jaffree court considered and summarily dismissed the work of W. W.
Crosskey, who criticized Fairman's conclusions at length. The work of Pro-
fessor Crosskey "impresses the Court as being designed to reach a result.
Namely, Crosskey was interested in providing a constitutional basis to sup-
port the desegregation decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)."'
5
The fallacy of the courts' approach is obvious. Even if Professor Crosskey
wished to support the Brown decision, his historical analysis of the intent of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment to make the Bill of Rights a limit
on the states would be valid or invalid regardless of his motives. By similar
logic one could dismiss the court's opinion in Jaffree by saying it was "design-
ed to reach a result," namely upholding religious exercises in the public
schools. The imputation of motive could be true and the writer's analysis
could be wrong or the imputation of motive could be true, but the writer's
anaylsis could be correct. Scholars who support incorporation have opposed
the Brown decision" while supporters of the decision have opposed incorpora-
tion."'
Even if Crosskey's work could be dismissed for the reason advanced by
the Jaffree court, the court's argument is misplaced. It is misplaced because
Professor Crosskey's article replying to Fairman nowhere mentions and, as
Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982) [hereinafter cited as The Fourteenth Amendment]; Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat. A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Further Adventures]; Avins, Incor-
poration of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1
(1968); Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5
CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965); H.
HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 386-438 (1982).
" Fairman, supra note 10, at 139.
" Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1124 n.33.
11 Id. at 1120-21 n.28.
"E.g., Avins, supra note 12.
Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter concurring) with Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (in which Justice Frankfurter also concurred).
1983]
3
Curtis: Judge Hand's History: An Analysis of History and Method in Jaffre
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
far as the reader can discern, was not concerned with the Brown decision.18
The Jaffree court also dismissed Professor Crosskey's law review article
criticizing Fairman on the basis of reviews of Crosskey's book Politics and
the Constitution, a book which did not contain most of the material set out in
Crosskey's article criticizing Fairman's analysis. The court agreed with a
critic that Crosskey's "typical analytical method" in Politics and the Con-
stitution was "slanderous, ad hominem attacks on those historical actors who
supported views contrary to those which Professor Crosskey expected to
find in the historical record."19
In this way the court dismissed Professor Crosskey and freed itself of the
need to analyze his arguments. If there is a neutral principle to be found in
such analysis, it must be that one may safely reject the work of those who
make ad hominem attacks on historical actors who support views contrary to
those they wish to find in the historical record.
The authorities relied on by the court, Raoul Berger and Professor Fair-
man, both make ad hominem attacks on leading advocates of the fourteenth
amendment. Both Berger and Fairman faced a difficult task in arguing
against incorporation because John A. Bingham, who wrote section one of the
fourteenth amendment, and Jacob Howard, who presented it to the United
States Senate, made statements indicating an intent to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states. For example, in presenting the prototype of the four-
teenth amendment to the House of Representatives, Bingham had relied on
his argument that the rights in the Bill of Rights were privileges or im-
munities for citizens of the United States which state officers should be
bound to support by their oath to support the constitution." However,
Bingham noted the provisions of the Bill of Rights were of no effect because
the Supreme Court had ruled that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights did not
limit the states. "[Ilt is equally clear by every construction of the Constitu-
tion, its contemporaneous construction, legislative, executive, and judicial,
that these great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal Bill of Rights
embodied in the Constitution, rested for its execution and enforcement
hitherto upon the fidelity of the States."21 To show why his amendment was
necessary, Bingham cited Barron v. Baltimore22 and Livingston v. Moore23 to
show "that the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the United
States courts the Bill of Rights under the articles of amendment to the Con-
stitution had been denied."24 In his final speech on the fourteenth amendment
Crosskey, supra note 12.
," Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1121 n.28.
' CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
21 Id.
3 2 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833).
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833).
24 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866).
[Vol. 86
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Bingham announced that it would allow the people "to protect by national
law the privileges and immunities of all citizens of the Republic and the in-
born rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall
be denied or abridged by the unconstitutional acts of any State."" It would
correct "flagrant violations of the guaranteed privileges of citizens of the
United States" such as state imposition of "cruel and unusual punishments."28
In presenting the fourteenth amendment to the Senate, Senator Howard
explained that the privileges or immunities clause would secure the
personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments to the
Constitution: such as the freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for a redress of
grievances, a right appertaining to each and all of the people; the right to keep
and bear arms; the right to be exempted from quartering of soldiers in a house
without the consent of the owner;...7
In addition, Howard noted that the amendment was necessary to correct
court decisions which had held that guarantees of the Bill of Rights did not
limit the states.'
Since the intent of the legislature may be gleaned from the statements of
leading proponents,' Fairman and Berger obviously had their jobs cut out for
them. Raoul Berger has responded to the problem by describing Bingham as
"muddled,"3 "inept,"31 as "veer[ing] as crazily as a rudderless ship," and as
"unable to understand what he read." 2 Professor Fairman suggested that
Bingham may have been "intentionally evasive" but that it was more likely
that he simply had not thought out the import of the words he had chosen.'
Following this analysis, the Jaffree court concludes that Bingham had no
clear idea of what the fourteenth amendment would accomplish.'
Senator Howard meets a similar fate. Fairman's article presented a
remark about Howard in such a fashion as to suggest that the Michigan
senator was not very bright." Berger quoted with approval an historian who
suggested that Howard was a "reckless ... radical," and a "Negrophle."3 By




0 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 136-37.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 219.
Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine Lived
Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435, 450 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Nine Lived Cat].
' Fairman, supra note 10, at 32.
24 Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1120.
Fairman, supra note 10, at 134 n.381.
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 147.
1983]
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contrast, Professor Crosskey's article makes no personal criticisms of
Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress.
3 7
If ad hominem attacks can be used to dismiss a scholar, Raoul Berger, the
court's chief authority, would have to be dismissed. For example, in replying
to one critic Berger says:
His 55 page screed represents an effort to quarrel his way into notice by claw-
ing up the back of one whom he describes as a "distinguished author." Strident
invective fills his every page. So gross and reckless are his many misrepresen-
tations that one might attribute them to malice but for his inability to weigh
evidence, to comprehend what he reads. For him "a veil of rhetoric supplants
proof." On the most charitable view, he was in haste to teach what he had not
learned.'
In short, the Jaffree court failed to apply the principles it relied upon
equally. The court dismissed Crosskey's article for ad hominem attacks
allegedly made in another book by Crosskey29 It did not apply the same stric-
tures to the authorities on which it relied.
In the final analysis, the district court rests its decision on history. To
understand the failure of the district court's analysis it is necessary to look in
detail at the history of the fourteenth amendment.
II. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. Historical Background
In the years after 1830, as slavery became an increasingly devisive
political issue, southern states passed laws which eliminated freedom of
speech and press for critics of slavery." As both Abraham Lincoln and
Stephen A. Douglas recognized, Republicans could not proclaim their ideas in
the South.4 ' As Republicans saw it, other guarantees of the Bill of Rights had
been violated by the states as well. Republicans were troubled by the way
southern states had dealt with individual liberty. 2 So there were strong
reasons for the Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress to believe that the
rights in the Bill of Rights should be binding on the states.
The major weakness in the historical examination of the fourteenth
37 Crosskey, supra note 12.
Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C.L. REv. 427, 428 (1980).
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1120-21 n.28.
,0 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2979 (1864).
" CREATED EQUAL, THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 290-91 (P. Angle
ed. 1958).
" See generally Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to
Professor Berger, 60 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 50-64 (1980). The Fourteenth Amendment, supra
note 12, at 241-58.
[Vol. 86
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amendment relied on by the district court is that the analysis ignores the
historical background of the amendment and attempts to view Republican
purposes and statements in light of the judicial orthodoxy of the times. The
judicial orthodoxy of 1866 however, held that blacks were not citizens and
had no rights which a white man was bound to respect;" that the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights did not place limits on the states;" and that the
privileges and immunities clause of the original Constitution only applied to
temporary visitors and did not restrict a state's power to limit rights of per-
manent residents."
Speeches by Republicans in the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Congress
show that Republicans generally believed that slavery had perverted con-
stitutional law and had produced court decisions which restricted the liber-
ties of the citizens. Leading Republicans asserted that blacks were citizens;
that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights did limit the states; and that the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2 established ajody of
absolute privileges or immunities, including the rights set forth in the Bill of
Rights, which states were bound to respect.46
These unorthodox legal views were held by Republicans prior to the
passage of the fourteenth amendment. ' The theories were shared by
Republican conservatives and radicals alike. 8 The issue which divided
Republican conservatives and radicals was not application of the Bill of
Rights to the states, but suffrage for the newly freed blacks.
B. The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
In 1866, two months before Congress submitted the fourteenth amend-
ment to the states, Congress passed (over the veto of President John-
son) the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided
that "all persons born in the United States" are "citizens of the United
States." The Act gave all such citizens the same rights in every state to
"make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property and to full
and equal benefit of all laws for the security of-person and property as is en-
,s Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404-05 (1857).
' Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
's Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422 (1857).
See generally The Fourteenth Amendment supra note 12, at 248-56, 274.
47 Id.
11 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1866). (remarks of Senator Cowan in-
dicating a belief that the fifth amendment limited the states. Cowan was a conservative
Republican who later deserted the party to support Andrew Johnson). John Bingham, indeed, was




Curtis: Judge Hand's History: An Analysis of History and Method in Jaffre
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
joyed by white citizens.' 9 So strong was the influence of Republican legal
theories on Republican legislators that leading Republicans argued the power
to pass the Civil Rights Bill could be derived from the power of Congress to
enforce the Bill of Rights. This argument was made, for example, by James
Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and by Representative
Thayer."
John A. Bingham, on the other hand, took the position that a constitu-
tional amendment was required before Congress would have power to en-
force the guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the states." Both the proto-
type" of the fourteenth amendment drafted by Bingham and the final version
of section 1, also primarily drafted by Bingham, were designed to give Con-
gress the power to enforce the guarantees of the Bill of Rights in the states.
The final version was also designed to give the courts the power to enforce
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, regardless of what action was taken by
Congress. To explain why his prototype of the amendment was necessary,
Bingham cited the Supreme Court decisions holding that the Bill of Rights
did not apply to the states.'
Bingham's interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause of the
original constitution to make the Bill of Rights a limit on the states was con-
sistent with antislavery tradition and was shared by other leading
Republicans. Bingham wrote the amendment and was a member of the Joint
Committee. His remarks, both on his prototype of the amendment and on the
final version, support the conclusion that it was intended to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states.4
As we have seen, Senator Howard, who presented the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Senate on behalf of the Joint Committee, explained that the
privileges or immunities clause was intended to include the personal rights
guaranteed by the first eight amendments (most of which Howard listed).
Senator Howard also recognized that the court opinions holding that the Bill
of Rights did not limit the states meant Congress could not enforce the
", Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
0 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (Wilson), 1153, 1270 (Thayer) (1866).
11 Id. at 1291-92 (Bingham). See generally The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at
267-74.
2 Bingham's prototype fourteenth amendment provided:
The Congress shal have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States equal protection in
the rights of life, liberty and property (fifth amendment).
B. KENTRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF 15 ON RECONSTRUCTION 61 (1914).
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866). See generally The Fourteenth Amend.
ment, supra note 12, at 258-67.
I See generally The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at 246-56, 258-66.
[Vol. 86
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guarantees without a constitutional amendment. Howard concluded: "The
great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore, to restrain
the power of the States and to compel them at all times to respect these
great fundamental guarantees."'
The great contribution made by Professor Crosskey was to focus on the
legal ideas held by Republicans, to distinguish them from orthodox legal doc-
trine, and to show how, read in light of antislavery legal thought, statements
by Bingham and other Republicans were substantially consistent. Professor
Fairman's failure to read Republican ideas in light of Republican legal
thought reduces those ideas to a hopeless jumble.,7 A hypothesis that makes
sense, instead of nonsense, out of the debates should be preferred.
The privileges or immunities clause was designed to insure that the
states would have to respect at least all of the rights of citizens of the United
States as set out in the Constitution. In addition to the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights, such rights as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
guarantee against ex post facto laws would also be protected. In debate in
the Thirty-ninth Congress, a number of congressmen and senators explained
the amendment by saying that it would provide that all rights of United
States citizens must be respected by the states." No legislator said that the
states would not be required to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The district court relied on the conclusions of Raoul Berger as set forth
in his book, Government by Judiciary. Berger, however, takes the position
that the intent of the legislature "may be evidenced by statements of leading
proponents," and that such intent once found, "is to be regarded as good as
written into the enactment."59 Two of the three leading proponents of the
fourteenth amendment, Bingham and Howard, indicated that the amendment
was intended to make the states respect the rights of United States citizens,
including those rights set out in the Bill of Rights. In an effort to explain
away Howard's clear remarks, the Jaffree court quotes statements that
Howard was a radical and a "Negrophle. '6 However, since radical and
moderate Republicans were not divided on the issue of application of the Bill
of Rights to the states, Howard's radicalism on the issue of black sufferage is
hardly a valid reason for discounting his speech. If Howard's statement was
wrong why did not Senator Fessenden, who was president,6 or any other
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66.
'" See Crosskey, supra note 12; The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at 241-81; Curtis,
supra note 40, at 88-92; Further Adventures, supra note 12, at 108-15.
17 Fairman, supra note 10.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3038 (Yates), 3167 (Windom), 3201 (Orth and App.) 256
(Baker) (1866).
' GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 136-37.
v' Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1121 n.29 (1983).
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768-70 (1866).
1983]
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member of the Committee correct it? It is seriously inaccurate to suggest, as
the district court does, that Howard's statement on incorporation was a
"remark" tucked away in the middle of a long speech."2
The district court, again relying on Berger, quotes Senator Poland as say-
ing that the fourteenth amendment secured nothing beyond what was intend-
ed by the original privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2.3
However, it is clear that leading Republicans who spoke about article IV, sec-
tion 2, adhered to an unorthodox interpretation of the clause whereby the
section protected the fundamental rights of American citizens, wherever
those rights might be. James Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee in the Thirty-ninth Congress, had interpreted the clause to protect
rights of American citizens including freedom of religious opinion and
freedom of speech and press. Bingham read the clause to protect the liber-
ties in the Bill of Rights as did Representatives Bromall and Hart." Raoul
Berger himself recognizes that the Republican reading of article IV was unor-
thodox. Furthermore, Berger ignores the fact that Senator Poland said that
article IV had become a dead letter because of the doctrine of State Rights,
"induced mainly, as I believe, for the protection of the peculiar system of the
South."
When Senator Poland said that the fourteenth amendment privileges or
immunities clause secured "nothing beyond what was intended" by the provi-
sion in article IV, section 2, his remarks indicated a difference between the
intent of the clause and the application it had received. Without knowing
what Senator Poland thought was originally intended, his remarks are of lit-
tle significance on the Bill of Rights issue. 5
The court also relies on Senator Doolittle who, according to the court,
made "some additional remarks which were designed to reassure those
whose votes had already been won in favor of passage of the fourteenth
amendment that indeed the amendment was limited to known objectives,
which objectives were not intended to encompass the federal Bill of Rights.""6
The remark to which the court refers is Doolittle's statement that the Civil
Rights Bill "was the forerunner of this constitutional amendment, and to give
vitality to which this constitutional amendment is brought forward."" Since
I Id. at 1122. Here, as elsewhere, the court repeats as truisms statements by Raoul Berger
which are demonstrably erroneous. See Curtis, supra note 40, at 92-96; Further Adventures,
supra note 12.
' Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1122.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (Wilson); 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088
(Bingham); 1695 (Hart) 1263 (Bromall) (1866).
Further Adventures, supra note 12, at 112-13.
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1122. Here again the court falls into a
clear factual error by relying on Berger.
11 GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at 149.
[Vol. 86
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Doolittle was an opponent of the measure,68 his remarks were obviously not
designed to reassure supporters. Nor is his statement inconsistent with
incorporation.
A number of senators and representatives noted the relationship be-
tween the Civil Rights Bill and the fourteenth amendment. Professors Fair-
man, Berger and the Jaffree court rely on this fact to disprove incorporation
of the Bill of Rights. 9 The Civil Rights Bill was quite similar to the four-
teenth amendment. The bill conferred citizenship upon blacks and among
other things, gave them "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. . .. ""
The Jaffree court relied on Professors Fairman and Berger's assumption
that the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill excluded guarantees
secured by the Bill of Rights. 71 However, by ordinary use of language, "laws
for the security of person and property" would include provisions in the Bill
of Rights. The Supreme Court has used the phrase to include rights in the
Bill of Rights.2 Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress clearly read the
"full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security of person and
property" as sufficiently broad as to include rights in the Bill of Rights.
When the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was passed, it provided that blacks should
have among other things "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and estate, including the constitutional rights of
bearing arms.
' 73
Virtually all Republicans who spoke on the subject assumed that rights in
the Bill of Rights were rights of citizens of the United States and limited or
should limit the states as well as the federal government. So most of these
Republicans probably read the Civil Rights Bill as encompassing protections
of the Bill of Rights liberties in the states. Indeed, the Civil Rights Bill had
been justified by Congressman Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee in the Thirty-ninth Congress, under the power of Congress to en-
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1866).
See Further Adventures, supra note 12, at 1. While most Republicans took a broader view,
a few made statements which can be read as saying the act only protected against discrimination.
See, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293. A few others declared the act and the amendment
identical. Statements that the act and the amendment were identical are inconsistent with the
idea that the act only protected against discrimination-because of the presence of the due pro-
cess clause. Further Adventures, supra note 12, at 104-06.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
T, Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1122-24.
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 449-50; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 635 (1866). See generally The Fourteenth Amendmen4 supra note 12, at 267-68.
's CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 654, 743, 1292 (1866) (The Freedmen's Bureau Bill, the
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force the Bill of Rights."' Statements that the fourteenth amendment em-
bodied the principles of the Civil Rights Bill tend to confirm, rather than
refute, an intent to apply the Bill of Rights to the states.
Both Senator Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
and Congressman Wilson, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the
House, took the position in the debate on the Civil Rights Bill that there were
certain absolute, fundamental rights of United States citizens, including the
rights to personal security, personal liberty and to acquire and enjoy prop-
erty, which no state could abridge. These Trumbull and Wilson identified
with article IV, section 2. Both legislators relied on statements from Kent
and Blackstone about the rights of personal liberty, personal security and
private property. 5 Blackstone listed the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right,
the Habeas Corpus Act and the English Bill of Rights and the Act of Settle-
ment as the declaraction of the rights and liberties of Englishmen. The
rights defined by "these several statutes," Blackstone said "consist in a
number of private immunities ... or else those civil privileges, which society
hath engaged to provide, in lieu of natural liberties so given up by in-
dividuals." '78 In short, for Blackstone, the rights to personal liberty, personal
security, and private property included all the privileges or immunities or
rights of the British citizen. For Wilson and Trumbull, the rights to personal
liberty, personal security and private property seem to have included all fun-
damental rights of citizens of the United States.
The district court says that only Howard and Bingham said anything
which "could be construed as suggesting the result reached by Justice Black
and the modern Supreme Court decisions [incorporation of the Bill of
Rights.] 7 However, a fair reading of the debates and an understanding of
Republican political and legal thought shows that the privileges or im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment was designed to protect at
least all rights of United States citizens including protection against ex post
facto laws or involuntary servitude and for the right to habeas corpus, as well as
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. A number of senators and represen-
tatives made statements indicating that they read the amendment in this
" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1294 (1866). See generally The Fourteenth Amendment,
supra note 12, at 251-58.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475, 1118-19 (1866).
1 W. BLACKSTONE., COMMENTARIES 129 (emphasis added). The Petition of Right listed such
rights as the right to the writ of habeas corpus, the right not to have soldiers quartered in private
homes and protection against summary trials. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 20-21 (1971). The English Bill of Rights contained provisions against excessive bails and
cruel or unusual punishment, a statement of the right of the people to bear arms, together with
the right to petition the King for redress of grievances. Id. at 40-46. The magna carta was read in
the colonies as at least protecting the right to trial by jury. II LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
200-01, 207 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
71 Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
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way. For example, Senator Yates said the amendment provided that "rights
[of citizens of the United States] shall not be abridged by any State."78 The
rights of citizens of the United States would include, but not be limited to,
those set out in the Bill of Rights. Congressman Windom suggested that the
amendment protected "all the rights of citizenship."79 Congressman Orth read
the amendment to protect "the rights of American citizenship."" Con-
gressman Baker read the amendment to protect "the rights thrown around
[the American citizen] by the supreme law of the land."81 Such statements are
consistent with statements made by Bingham and Howard and are inconsis-
tent with the conclusion of the district court.
Almost none of the statements made in the campaign of 1866 and relied
on by Professor Fairman and the Jaffree court are inconsistent with incor-
poration of the Bill of Rights. The general theme in the campaign of 1866 was
that the amendment protected "all the rights of citizens."82 Republican sup-
porters of the amendment referred to privileges "conferred on every citizen
by the federal constitution,"' "the full enjoyment of all constitutional rights,
among which are the right to free speech and to be secure in their personal
property, as well as redress of their grievances,"' "the rights of citizens
enumerated in the constitution,"' '85 "the rights of American freemen ... not
the least of which are the rights to speak, to write and to impress their
thoughts on the minds of others . . .,," "every right guaranteed ... by the
constitution"8 including the right to petition for redress of grievances and
the right to bear arms, and "constitutional rights" including the right to ex-
press one's sentiments freely.8 Statements by a number of Republicans in-
dicated that all free citizens even prior to the fourteenth amendment, were
vested with the privileges provided by the Bill of Rights against state action
and that the fourteenth amendment was declaratory on this point.89
Senator Trumbull believed that the fourteenth amendment secured "civil
liberty to all citizens of the United States" a provision he considered perhaps
unnecessary because of the thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Bill.
"[Sitill the Declaration of the great principles of individual freedom and civil
78 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3038 (1866).
,9 Id. at 3167.
Id. at 3201.
8, Id. at 256 app.
', The Fourteenth Amendment supra note 12 at 282.
Dubuque Daily Times, Nov. 21, 1866 at 2, col. 1.
Dubuque Daily Times, Dec. 3, 1866, at 2, col. 2.
N.Y. Daily Tribune, Sept. 4, 1866, at 1, col. 4.
N.Y. Daily Tribune, Sept. 11, 1866, at 5, col. 1.
87 Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 5, 1866, at 8, col 3.
Springfield Daily Illinois St. J., Sept. 21, 1866, at 2, col. 6. See generally The Fourteenth
Amendment supra note 12, at 281-92.
" See The Fourteenth Amendment supra note 12, at 281-92.
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liberty cannot be too often repeated... ."I' Congressman Wilson suggested
that the amendment would secure "liberty of speech." Congressmen Allison
and Bingham made the same suggestions.91 In short, the Jaffree court, like
the scholars on whom it relied, overlooked a substantial portion of the rele-
vant history.
The same is true with regard to state legislative debates. In many states
the debates were either not recorded or no statements of substance were
made by Republicans. In the Pennsylvania legislature, however, the debates
were lengthy and recorded. There, Republicans insisted that the amendment
was necessary to secure freedom, including freedom of speech and to secure
for citizens "the enjoyment of all their constitutional rights."92
Radicals in the Massachusetts legislature considered the amendment
useless because it simply provided what was already provided for in the Con-
stitution, including protection against state infringement of the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. The more moderate view prevailed and the amendment
was ratified. The more moderate Republicans did not quarrel with the inter-
pretation that the amendment was designed to secure rights in the Bill of
Rights. Rather, they found it a "statement of the true intent and meaning of
American citizenship."93
C. The Blaine Amendment
The Jaffree court's reliance on the Blaine Amendment debates to show
that the Thirty-ninth Congress did not intend to apply the Bill of Rights to
the states is also misplaced 9 4 The Blaine Amendment, debated in 1876, was
designed to prevent any state from making any law respecting the establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
In the years after the passage of the fourteenth amendment, a number of
congressmen and senators said explicitly that the fourteenth amendment was
designed to make the states obey those rights conferred in the Bill of Rights.
These included Congressman Bingham who authored the amendment, Repre-
sentative Hoar, Representative Dawes, Representative Monroe, Benjamin
Butler, Senator Joseph Fowler of Tennessee, Representative Howard
Manard of Tennessee, Representative Lawrence of Ohio, a leading
Republican in the Thirty-ninth Congress, Senator Frelinghusen of New
Jersey and Senator Sherman of Ohio, all Republicans.95 In addition, a number
of Democrats including Representative Mills of Texas and Senator Norwood
Id. at 290.
91 Id. at 291-92.
'2Id. at 295.
Id. at 297-98.
Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1125.
'5 Further Adventures, supra note 12, at 114-19.
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of Georgia accepted the proposition that the fourteenth amendment
privileges or immunities clause was designed to make the Bill of Rights apply
to the states.98
During the debates on the fourteenth amendment and in the early years
after its passage, not a single Republican said explicitly that the amendment
was not designed to make the Bill of Rights binding on the states. Many
made statements to the contrary. Most of the debate which took place on the
Blaine Amendment and which is cited by the district court in Jaffree occur-
red after the constricted reading of the privileges or immunities clause in the
Slaughterhouse Cases,' and after the Supreme Court had explicitly rejected
application of the Bill of Rights to the states in- United States v. Crnikshank98
and in Walker v. Sauvient 9 In short, it is not surprising that in the Blaine
Amendment debates, congressmen did not say that the privileges or im-
munities clause of the fourteenth amendment already prohibited the states
from establishment of religion. The Supreme Court had quite recently and
explicitly held that none of the guarantees applied to the states. Debates, ten
years after the fourteenth amendment was framed and after intervening
Supreme Court decisions had eviscerated it, shed no light on the purposes of
the framers of the fourteenth amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
The Jaffree court attempted to justify its disregard for controlling
precedent by an historical analysis. Judge Hand said:
If we, who today rule, do not follow the teachings of history then surely the
very weight of what we are about will bring the house upon our head, and the
public having rightly lost respect in the integrity of the institution, will
ultimately bring about its change or even its demise."°
But at least as far as the fourteenth amendment is concerned, the court's
warnings are misdirected because the court's examination of the history of
the fourteenth amendment is defective. The Jaffree court fails to consider
Republican legal, political and philosophical thought in the Civil War period.
By neglecting Republican ideas and by reading the debates from a standpoint
of legal orthodoxy, the court is simply unable to make sense of what was said.
The district court relied on scholars who failed to note or explain the fact
that Republicans who spoke on the subject generally held the unorthodox
constitutional idea that the states were, at the time of the congressional
SId.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
92 U.S. 542 (1876).
92 U.S. 90 (1876).
,C Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1130 n.41.
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debates on the fourteenth amendment, already required to obey the Bill of
Rights. In addition, these scholars and the court have overlooked evidence
from the campaign of 1866 which suggests an intent to apply the Bill of
Rights to the states. They have also failed to see that leading Republicans in-
terpreted the privileges and immunities clause of the original Constitution to
require the states to follow the letter and the spirit of the Bill of Rights.
The scholars relied upon by the Jaffree court also fundamentally
misunderstand and underestimate the effect of the struggle against slavery
on Republican ideology. The fourteenth amendment embodied and affirmed
deeply-held Republican legal and philosophical beliefs.
The scholars relied on by the court fail to expalin why not a single
Republican during the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress said that the
fourteenth amendment was not designed to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states. Both Bingham and Howard, leading proponents of the amendment,
clearly indicated it would require the states to abide by the Bill of Rights. In
1866 no member of the Thirty-ninth Congress contradicted them. However,
the Jaffree court, following Raoul Berger's analysis, mistakenly characterized
Howard's lengthy statement on incorporation of the Bill of Rights as merely
a casual remark.
The district court is repeatedly misled by its reliance on Berger. Berger's
work is riddled with errors of fact and interpretation. For example, Berger
argued that the failure of any major newspaper to report Howard's reference
to the Bill of Rights somehow robbed the remarks of authority and that if the
framers intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights "honesty required
disclosure." In fact, Howard's statement was reported in several major
newspapers including the first page of the New York Times."' And, the in-
tent to incorporate the Bill of Rights was disclosed in the pages of the Con-
gressional Globe in no uncertain terms.
The two scholars opposed to full incorporation and relied upon by the
district court, have also suggested that the civil jury trial requirement of the
seventh amendment would have been regarded by the country as an in-
tolerable interference with state sovereignty. In the 1830s several states
passed personal liberty laws to provide trial by jury and other procedural
rights for those claimed as slaves.' In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, decided in
1842, the Supreme Court held that federal power over fugitive slaves was ex-
clusive. The personal liberty laws were held unconstitutional with the result
that blacks in free states could be seized as slaves without any of the pro-
cedural guarantees set out in the personal liberty laws.0 3 Finally, Congress
lot N.Y. Times, May 24, 1866, at 1, col. 6. See also GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 9, at
148 n.66 (1977) (Berger's comments).
' See generally T. MOORIs, FREE MEN ALL (1974).
103 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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passed the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 which provided explicitly that blacks
could be denied the right to testify, to cross-examine and to receive a jury
trial before they were delivered to those claiming them as slaves. °4
Opponents of slavery contended that the Fugitive Slave Act was a viola-
tion of the fourth, fifth, and seventh amendments. °5 Indeed, the Fugitive
Slave Act was repealed by a Republican Congress in 1864.1" Fresh from their
experience with the Fugitive Slave Laws, Republicans thought that trial by
jury was one of the precious rights of American citizens. After the passage of
the fourteenth amendment, several Republican legislators said the seventh
amendment was a limitation on the states. 7
The decision of the district court in Jaffree, represents another battle in
the seemingly endless war fought to determine how the Constitution should
be applied. As C. Van Woodward has noted, political movements in America
have always sought to gain control of history. Woodward cites the commissar
in George Orwell's book 1984: "Who controls the past controls the future,
who controls the present controls the past."'0 8 From that perspective, the
district court's assertions about the past are clearly relevant to the present
and to the future. A careful examination of the history relied on by the
district court in Jaffree shows, however, that it does not support the court's
conclusions.
"' Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, §§ 1-10, 9 Stat. 462 (1850).
"s See, e.g., T. MOORIS, FREE MEN ALL (1974).
ICONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2919 (1864).
0 The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at 298-300.
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